The Prosecution [of Impeachments], Will Seldom Fail

Good Constitutions Are Formed Upon A Comparison Of The Liberty Of The Individual With The Strength Of Government: If The Tone Of Either Be Too High, The Other Will Be Weakened Too Much. It Is The Happiest Possible Mode Of Conciliating These Objects, To Institute One Branch Peculiarly Endowed With Sensibility, Another With Knowledge And Firmness. Through The Opposition And Mutual Control Of These Bodies, The Government Will Reach, In Its Regular Operations, The Perfect Balance Between Liberty And Power.

It Is Of The Nature Of War To Increase The Executive At The Expense Of The Legislative Authority.

Wherever Indeed A Right Of Property Is Infringed For The General Good, If The Nature Of The Case Admits Of Compensation, It Ought To Be Made; But If Compensation Be Impracticable, That Impracticability Ought To Be An Obstacle To A Clearly Essential Reform.

If We Are In Earnest About Giving The Union Energy And Duration We Must Abandon The Vain Project Of Legislating Upon The States In Their Collective Capacities.

And As The Vicissitudes Of Nations Beget A Perpetual Tendency To The Accumulation Of Debt, There Ought To Be In Every Government A Perpetual, Anxious, And Unceasing Effort To Reduce That, Which At Any Times Exists, As Fast As Shall Be Practicable Consistently With Integrity And Good Faith.