As Has Happened So Often In History,

It Should Be The Aim Of Grand Strategy To Discover And Pierce The Achilles' Heel Of The Opposing Government's Power To Make War. Strategy, In Turn, Should Seek To Penetrate A Joint In The Harness Of The Opposing Forces. To Apply One's Strength Where The Opponent Is Strong Weakens Oneself Disproportionately To The Effect Attained. To Strike With Strong Effect, One Must Strike At Weakness.

If You Find Your Opponent In A Strong Position Costly To Force, You Should Leave Him A Line Of Retreat As The Quickest Way Of Loosening His Resistance. It Should, Equally, Be A Principle Of Policy, Especially In War, To Provide Your Opponent With A Ladder By Which He Can Climb Down.

The More Usual Reason For Adopting A Strategy Of Limited Aim Is That Of Awaiting A Change In The Balance Of Force ... The Essential Condition Of Such A Strategy Is That The Drain On Him Should Be Disproportionately Greater Than On Oneself.

The Profoundest Truth Of War Is That The Issue Of Battle Is Usually Decided In The Minds Of The Opposing Commanders, Not In The Bodies Of Their Men.

For Even The Best Of Peace Training Is More Theoretical Than Practical Experience ... Indirect Practical Experience May Be The More Valuable Because Infinitely Wider.